Executive Summary
Purpose and Context
This Red Team exercise explored three potential outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war and possible influences on China’s strategic calculus in both Europe and Taiwan. The CCP views the Russia-Ukraine war primarily through an anti-Western lens with an eye towards economic and political gains.
Key Findings
- External Variables Matter: U.S. policy choices and Taiwanese domestic politics are expected to be the most decisive variables for Chinese behavior.
- Integrity of Taiwan Plans: The outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war only affected resources available and perceived timeline for Taiwanese reunification but not overall conceptualization and planning.
- Economic Vulnerabilities: China remains vulnerable to economic isolation from the West.
- Stable Junior Partner: The relative power of Russia is of key concern to China. Beijing benefits from a stable Russia that is the “junior partner.”
Scenario Based Insights
- Blooming Sunflowers: Given a peace plan loosely based on Ukrainian demands, the Committee expected the outcome would be predicated on or cause the collapse of Putin’s regime. This plan would give the PRC an opportunity to showcase China’s peacebuilding credentials.
- Bear in Charge: Loosely based on Russian demands, the committee had concerns over an overconfident Putin acting more aggressively. They identified two potential paths for the West.
- Wise Dragon: The goldilocks outcome based on the joint Chinese-Brazilian plan. The committee saw this as the best outcome for China.
Recommendations for Western Response
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Analyze PRC economic dependencies and develop plans for financial isolation.
Western policymakers should study and map China’s exposure to the global financial system, including reliance on SWIFT and dollar-denominated instruments. Developing detailed, pre-positioned plans for financial isolation—including the ability to restrict access to international payment systems—would signal Western resolve and impose credible costs on aggressive Chinese behavior. Additionally, investing in information tools like Radio Free Asia and its equivalents can challenge Beijing’s domestic narrative and erode the Party’s control over the information environment.
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Strengthen alliances by closing the credibility gap.
Beijing closely monitors fractures in the transatlantic alliance and seeks to exploit them. The West must invest in sustained diplomatic engagement, not only with traditional allies but also with Global South partners who are targets of Chinese commercial diplomacy. Building robust alliance structures—and demonstrating their durability—will narrow the space for Chinese wedge strategies. Preparing coordinated economic warfare capabilities across allied nations will compound deterrent effects.
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Develop China expertise to mitigate risks of miscommunication.
Strategic empathy—the ability to understand an adversary’s worldview without endorsing it—is critically underdeveloped in Western policy circles. Investment in Mandarin language training, cultural competency, and direct diplomatic channels is essential. Establishing and maintaining crisis hotlines and back-channel communication mechanisms with Beijing would reduce the risk of escalation through miscalculation.
Introduction
The Imperative
Just as the rest of the world has watched the conflict in Ukraine closely, Chinese leadership also observes and learns from it. A peace settlement—or a frozen conflict—in Ukraine will reshape the global security environment in ways that directly affect Beijing’s strategic planning. Understanding how China perceives these outcomes is not merely an academic exercise; it is an operational imperative for Western policymakers who must anticipate Chinese behavior across multiple domains.
Strategic empathy demands that analysts move beyond mirror-imaging and instead inhabit the decision-making frameworks of their adversaries. This report captures the findings of an exercise designed to do precisely that: to think as Beijing thinks, plan as Beijing plans, and identify the opportunities and vulnerabilities that China’s leadership would see in a post-war European landscape.
Exercise Background
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the continued relevance of great power politics and the willingness of revisionist actors to use military force to reshape the international order. China’s “no-limits” relationship with Russia, declared just days before the 2022 invasion, has evolved into a complex partnership in which Beijing provides diplomatic cover and supplies dual-use goods while publicly maintaining a posture of neutrality.
The conflict has also served as a laboratory for lessons that China applies to its own strategic planning, particularly regarding Taiwan. Beijing has studied Western sanctions regimes, alliance cohesion under stress, the role of information warfare, and the military-industrial capacity of democratic states. Each potential outcome of the war carries different implications for China’s assessment of risk and opportunity.
Objectives
The purpose of this Red Team exercise was to systematically identify vulnerabilities, gaps, and blind spots in Western strategic thinking by adopting the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party. Specifically, the exercise sought to:
- Assess how the PRC perceives the three potential outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war and the strategic implications of each.
- Identify what opportunities and risks the PRC leadership would see for advancing Chinese interests in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and with respect to Taiwan.
- Produce actionable recommendations that Western policymakers can use to anticipate and counter Chinese strategic moves across multiple scenarios.
Exercise & Report Format
Red Team analysis challenges conventional thinking by having analysts adopt the perspective of an adversary or competitor. This structured analytic technique requires analysts to shift from observing opponents to becoming actors who think and respond as the adversary would do so. The method proves especially valuable when facing counterparts with different cultures, values, or decision-making processes.
Red Teams immerse themselves in their assigned roles, producing authentic products like policy papers and strategic recommendations that the adversary might create.
The technique helps organizations identify blind spots, test assumptions about adversary behavior, and develop more robust strategies. By forcing analysis to see situations through opponents’ eyes, Red Team analysis reveals vulnerabilities and alternative courses of action that might otherwise go unrecognized.
The exercise ran for one day and brought together five expert participants with deep knowledge of Chinese foreign policy, military strategy, and intelligence analysis. The group operated in a “committee” style format under Chatham House Rules, meaning that while the substance of the discussions is reported here, the identities of individual participants are not attributed.
The first workshop activity established a baseline Chinese strategic posture—an assessment of Beijing’s current priorities, threat perceptions, and opportunity horizons. Participants were then presented with three scenarios, each framed as a fictional policy memo to Wang Yi, Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission. For each scenario, the committee was asked to assess the situation from Beijing’s perspective, identify key implications, and produce strategic recommendations.
Directive & Baseline Strategy
Baseline
Before engaging with the individual scenarios, the committee established a baseline assessment of China’s strategic posture. This baseline reflected the consensus view of how Beijing perceives the current international environment and the priorities that guide its decision-making. The committee identified several core assumptions that would hold across all three scenarios:
First, the reunification of Taiwan remains the paramount strategic objective for the Chinese Communist Party. This is not a contingent or negotiable goal—it is a core interest that shapes all other calculations. Second, Beijing values stability in its relationship with Russia but is wary of becoming too closely tied to an unpredictable partner. A weakened or destabilized Russia creates risks for China; an overconfident Russia may drag China into unwanted confrontations. Third, economic growth and domestic stability remain essential to the CCP’s legitimacy. The leadership is acutely aware of China’s vulnerability to economic isolation and the potential disruption of its access to global markets and financial systems.
Blooming Flowers
Under a scenario in which Ukraine achieves a peace broadly consistent with its demands, the committee assessed that Beijing would view the outcome through the lens of regime stability in Russia and the implications for Western confidence. A Russian setback could embolden the West but also create opportunities for China to position itself as a responsible power broker.
Bear in Charge
A Russian victory scenario raised concerns within the committee about the risks of an emboldened Moscow. The committee assessed that an overconfident Putin could pursue further adventurism, potentially drawing China into situations it would prefer to avoid. At the same time, a weakened West might create short-term opportunities for China in Europe and the developing world.
Wise Dragon
The committee assessed the Chinese-Brazilian peace plan scenario as the most favorable outcome for Beijing. It would preserve Russia as a stable junior partner, enhance China’s international prestige, and create favorable conditions for advancing Chinese interests across multiple theaters.
Hotwash
Following the three scenario assessments, the committee conducted a “hotwash”—an immediate debrief designed to capture initial impressions and identify cross-cutting themes. The most striking finding was the consistency of China’s Taiwan planning across all three scenarios. Regardless of the outcome in Ukraine, the committee assessed that Beijing’s fundamental approach to reunification would remain unchanged; only the timeline and available resources would shift.
The committee also noted the centrality of U.S. policy choices and Taiwanese domestic politics as the variables most likely to influence Chinese behavior—more so than the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war itself. This underscored the importance of looking beyond the immediate crisis to understand the broader drivers of Chinese strategic calculus.
Scenarios & Recommendations
Scenario 1: Blooming Sunflowers
FROM: Leading Small Group on Ukraine
DATE: 05 June 2025
SUBJ: BLOOMING SUNFLOWERS UKR-RUS Peace Deal Priorities
The Special Advisory Committee convened to examine the recently concluded peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Largely settled in accordance with the Ukrainian demands, we assess the following priorities for the People’s Republic of China.
- European troops are deployed to Ukraine as part of a multilateral peacekeeping force.
- Ukraine enters into bilateral defense agreements with key European states.
- All prisoners of war are returned through exchange mechanisms.
- A multilateral reconstruction fund is established for Ukraine’s rebuilding.
- Ukraine is granted accelerated EU accession status.
- Russian troops withdraw to pre-February 2022 lines.
- A process is established for the prosecution of war crimes.
The current situation reflects setbacks to Russia’s war aims and represents a significant shift in the European security architecture. The committee assesses that this outcome was likely predicated on, or will precipitate, the collapse or severe weakening of Putin’s regime. A destabilized Russia presents both risks and opportunities for the PRC.
The reconstruction of Ukraine will create significant commercial opportunities, particularly in infrastructure and construction—sectors where China holds global competitive advantages. The PRC should position itself to participate meaningfully in reconstruction efforts, leveraging existing overcapacity in the construction sector.
The deployment of European peacekeeping forces and bilateral defense agreements signal a more assertive European security posture. This development must be monitored closely for its implications on European defense spending, NATO cohesion, and the overall Western military posture in the Indo-Pacific.
Regarding reunification: this scenario does not fundamentally alter the PRC’s timeline or approach to Taiwan. However, the demonstrated willingness of Western nations to sustain a prolonged commitment to Ukraine’s defense suggests that any military action regarding Taiwan would face similarly sustained opposition. The committee recommends continued development of non-kinetic approaches alongside military preparations.
- Leverage construction overcapacity. Position Chinese state-owned enterprises to participate in Ukrainian reconstruction through multilateral mechanisms. This serves dual purposes: absorbing domestic overcapacity and building political influence in the region. Emphasize China’s peacebuilding credentials and willingness to contribute to post-conflict stabilization.
- Increase intelligence collection operations. The post-conflict environment in Ukraine and the deployment of European forces create new intelligence requirements and opportunities. Expand collection on European military capabilities, alliance dynamics, and lessons-learned processes that Western militaries will undertake.
- Advocate for UN centrality in peace processes. Position the PRC as a champion of multilateral solutions and UN-centered diplomacy. This enhances China’s international standing and provides leverage in future negotiations on other issues, including Taiwan-related matters.
Scenario 2: Bear in Charge
FROM: Leading Small Group on Ukraine
DATE: 05 June 2025
SUBJ: BEAR IN CHARGE UKR-RUS Peace Deal Priorities
The Special Advisory Committee convened to examine the recently concluded peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Largely settled in accordance with Russian demands, we assess the following priorities for the People’s Republic of China.
- Russia’s territorial claims in eastern and southern Ukraine are recognized or left unresolved in Russia’s favor.
- No European forces are deployed to Ukraine.
- Security agreements for Ukraine remain vague and non-binding.
- A demilitarized zone is established along the line of contact.
- War crimes proceedings are deferred or abandoned.
- Ukrainian armed forces are limited in size and capability.
- Western sanctions on Russia are progressively removed.
This outcome represents a victory for Russia and a significant setback for the Western alliance. The committee identifies three primary concerns:
First, an emboldened Russia. Putin, vindicated by victory, may be tempted toward further adventurism in the post-Soviet space or beyond. An overconfident junior partner is a liability for China. Moscow may act in ways that provoke Western responses detrimental to Chinese interests, or may demand greater Chinese support for future ventures. The committee assesses that managing the Russia relationship will require careful calibration to maintain Moscow’s utility as a strategic partner without being drawn into its ambitions.
Second, Western revitalization. A Russian victory in Ukraine may paradoxically galvanize the West. Historical precedent suggests that democratic alliances often respond to defeat with renewed investment and resolve. The committee should prepare for a potential surge in Western defense spending, accelerated NATO expansion, and a hardening of Western posture toward authoritarian states generally—including China.
Third, dividing transatlantic relations. Alternatively, a Russian victory could deepen existing fractures within the Western alliance. Recriminations over the failure to defend Ukraine, combined with economic pressures from energy disruption and refugee flows, could weaken European cohesion. The PRC should be prepared to exploit these divisions through targeted diplomatic and commercial engagement.
The committee identified two potential paths for the West in this scenario: revitalization or fragmentation. Chinese strategy must be prepared for either outcome and should actively work to encourage the latter while preparing for the former.
- Utilize senior officials for engagement in Ukraine. Deploy high-level diplomatic missions to Kyiv to establish China as a relevant actor in post-conflict Ukraine. Even in a Russian-dominated settlement, Ukraine will seek to diversify its international relationships. China can position itself as an alternative to both Western and Russian influence.
- Decrease dual-use exports to Russia. Reduce the flow of goods that could be traced to Chinese origins and used in further Russian military operations. This mitigates the risk of secondary sanctions and maintains China’s posture of neutrality. Redirect industrial capacity toward domestic military modernization and other strategic priorities.
- Complete economic self-reliance programs. Accelerate efforts to reduce dependence on Western technology, financial systems, and markets. A Russian victory may trigger a broader Western reassessment of engagement with authoritarian states, and China must be prepared for increased economic pressure. Prioritize domestic semiconductor development, alternative payment systems, and diversified supply chains.
Scenario 3: Wise Dragon
FROM: Leading Small Group on Ukraine
DATE: 05 June 2025
SUBJ: WISE DRAGON UKR-RUS Peace Deal Priorities
The Special Advisory Committee convened to examine the recently concluded peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Settled in accordance with the Chinese-Brazilian proposal, we identify three factors for the People’s Republic of China: the centrality of the United Nations in the peace process, the unsettled nature of the arrangement, and opportunities for shaping the domestic narrative.
- United Nations peacekeeping forces are deployed to monitor the ceasefire and separation of forces.
- Limited security agreements are established through multilateral frameworks.
- Bilateral reconstruction agreements are pursued outside of a single multilateral fund.
- Access to raw materials and energy resources is negotiated through bilateral channels.
- Borders are established on a bilateral basis, with some areas remaining under negotiation.
- War crimes proceedings are referred to international mechanisms but remain slow-moving.
- All prisoners of war are returned.
This outcome is the most advantageous to Chinese interests. It preserves Russia as a stable junior partner, enhances China’s international prestige as a peacemaker, and creates favorable conditions across multiple strategic domains. The committee identifies three primary factors:
First, UN centrality. The deployment of UN peacekeeping forces with Chinese participation elevates China’s status in the international order. Beijing can leverage its role in peacekeeping to project influence, gather intelligence, and build relationships with both parties. China’s voice in UN Security Council deliberations gains additional weight and credibility. This outcome also establishes a precedent for UN-centered conflict resolution that could be invoked in future disputes where China wishes to limit unilateral Western action.
Second, the chaotic and unsettled nature of the arrangement. The bilateral, piecemeal character of the peace creates spaces for Chinese engagement that would not exist in a comprehensive, Western-led settlement. Bilateral reconstruction agreements allow Chinese state-owned enterprises to compete for contracts without submitting to multilateral conditionality. Unresolved territorial questions keep both parties dependent on external mediation—a role China is well-positioned to fill. The slow pace of war crimes proceedings reduces pressure on Russia and preserves the relationship.
Third, the domestic narrative. This outcome allows the CCP to present the war as a “far away war” that China helped resolve through wise and patient diplomacy. The narrative of Chinese peacemaking reinforces domestic legitimacy and distracts from internal economic challenges. It also counters Western attempts to portray China as complicit in Russian aggression.
Intelligence collection opportunities are significant. The deployment of Chinese peacekeepers and the presence of Chinese construction firms in Ukraine provide cover for expanded human intelligence operations in a region of growing strategic importance. The committee recommends maximizing these opportunities.
- Utilize unarmed peacekeepers for intelligence collection. Chinese contributions to UN peacekeeping operations in Ukraine should be structured to maximize intelligence-gathering opportunities. Deploy personnel with language skills and technical expertise to positions that provide access to Western military operations, European defense infrastructure, and Ukrainian reconstruction planning. Coordinate collection priorities with the Ministry of State Security and the PLA’s Strategic Support Force.
- Steer reconstruction toward Chinese companies. Leverage bilateral reconstruction agreements to direct contracts toward Chinese state-owned enterprises, particularly in infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy. Use the Belt and Road Initiative framework to structure financing in ways that create long-term economic dependencies. Prioritize projects that provide strategic access, such as ports, rail networks, and digital infrastructure.
- Conduct a comprehensive information campaign. Develop and execute a coordinated information campaign emphasizing China’s role as peacemaker and responsible great power. Target audiences in the Global South, Europe, and domestic Chinese populations. Counter Western narratives that portray China as complicit in Russian aggression by highlighting the peace agreement as evidence of Chinese diplomatic leadership.
Lessons for the “Blue Team”
SWIFT Action
The committee’s discussions repeatedly returned to China’s vulnerability to economic isolation. Across all three scenarios, the possibility of being cut off from the SWIFT international payment system and broader Western financial infrastructure emerged as a significant concern. This suggests that the threat of financial isolation remains one of the West’s most potent deterrents.
Western policymakers should develop detailed, pre-positioned plans for economic slowdown measures targeting China’s financial sector. These plans should include not only sanctions on specific entities but also the capability to restrict China’s access to the dollar-denominated financial system. The credibility of this threat depends on demonstrating that the West has both the tools and the political will to implement it.
Additionally, the committee’s sensitivity to information warfare suggests that investments in counter-narrative capabilities—including Radio Free Asia and similar outlets—can impose real costs on Beijing by challenging the CCP’s control of the domestic information environment. Western information operations should be designed not only to inform Chinese citizens but to force the CCP to expend resources on internal narrative management.
Closing the Credibility Gap
A recurring theme in the committee’s assessments was the political question of Western credibility. Beijing closely watches for signs of division within the transatlantic alliance and views any fracture as an opportunity. Chinese warfare—in the informational, economic, and diplomatic domains—is designed to exploit these divisions.
The West must recognize that alliance cohesion is itself a form of deterrence. Closing the credibility gap requires sustained diplomatic engagement, not only among NATO members but with partners in the Indo-Pacific and Global South who are targets of Chinese commercial diplomacy. It also requires investment in joint economic warfare capabilities—coordinated sanctions, export controls, and investment screening mechanisms that demonstrate allied unity.
The committee also noted that China views transatlantic divisions as a wedge to be driven deeper into Western alliance systems. Proactive efforts to demonstrate solidarity—through joint exercises, coordinated diplomatic statements, and aligned economic policies—will narrow the space for Chinese wedge strategies.
Empathizing with Friends and Foes
The exercise underscored the risks of applying Western constructs to understanding Chinese decision-making. The CCP does not operate on Western timelines, does not share Western assumptions about the role of international law, and does not assess risk using the same frameworks. Strategic empathy—the ability to understand an adversary’s worldview without endorsing it—is essential for effective policy.
For example, the committee’s assessment that the PLA should be ready to conduct reunification operations by 2027 reflects a planning milestone, not a predetermined decision point. Western analysts who treat this date as a deadline risk either overreacting to military preparations or underestimating the flexibility of Chinese planning.
Investment in diplomatic engagement and crisis communication mechanisms is critical. Establishing and maintaining hotlines, back-channel communications, and regular senior-level dialogues with Beijing can reduce the risk of miscalculation. Equally important is the development of deep China expertise within Western government and military institutions—including Mandarin language skills, cultural competency, and sustained analytical attention to Chinese domestic politics.
Conclusion
This exercise set out to identify what lessons China may take from a resolution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and how those lessons would shape Beijing’s strategic behavior. The findings are both reassuring and sobering.
The null finding on kinetic operations is significant: across all three scenarios, the committee did not assess that the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war would trigger or significantly accelerate a Chinese military operation against Taiwan. The fundamental drivers of China’s Taiwan calculus—U.S. policy choices, Taiwanese domestic politics, and the PLA’s own readiness assessments—were seen as more decisive than events in Europe.
However, the exercise revealed that each scenario provides greater latitude for Chinese gains in the political, economic, and informational domains. Whether through reconstruction contracts, intelligence collection under peacekeeping cover, or information campaigns designed to enhance China’s international prestige, Beijing will seek to extract maximum advantage from any outcome.
The battlefield, from China’s perspective, is primarily political and economic rather than military. Western strategy must adapt accordingly, focusing on alliance structures, economic resilience, and information capabilities as much as military deterrence.
Ultimately, this exercise demonstrated the value of structured Red Team analysis in producing an enhanced understanding of Chinese thinking. By forcing analysts to adopt Beijing’s perspective, the exercise revealed assumptions, blind spots, and strategic opportunities that conventional analysis might miss. The recommendations in this report—both those produced “in character” and those offered for the Blue Team—are intended to contribute to a more informed, more empathetic, and more effective Western strategy.